The South China Sea and the Trump Factor

A rowboat with a China Coast Guard ship in the distance | TED ALJIBE via Getty Images

In an article by the Asia Society Policy Institute, Andrew Chubb explores how recent incidents in the South China Sea have increased scrutiny of the United States’ commitment to its Indo-Pacific allies.

During Donald Trump’s first term, a pause in maritime tensions meant Washington’s obligations were not tested. However, today’s regional environment is far more volatile. Unlike in 2017, Beijing’s coercive behavior in the first part of 2025 has resulted in incidents with Australia and the Philippines, and Manila is pushing back through public exposure and resistance.

As Trump signals interest in a meeting with Xi Jinping, could a transactional foreign policy leave frontline U.S. partners exposed?1

That prospect has been central to Beijing’s messaging to the region this year. China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, argued as much at a March 7 press conference during the Two Sessions.2 In an unusual broadside against the Philippines — the primary U.S.-allied claimant in the South China Sea — Wang warned that “infringement and provocation will backfire, and those acting as others’ chess pieces are bound to be discarded.”3 Chinese spokespersons have since repeated the line, most recently at a Ministry of National Defense press briefing on April 9.4

Trump’s first term fortuitously coincided with a lull in South China Sea tensions: Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (2016–22) sought Chinese economic assistance, and Beijing restrained its maritime assertiveness in hopes of peeling away a U.S. ally. As a result, the U.S. commitment was not seriously tested.